We construct an overlapping-generations experiment to test for some allegedly departures from Ricardian equivalence. In the first treatment the setting is close to the theoretical model, while in the second we allow for liquidity-constrained consumers. Finally, we introduce uncertainty on future income. We can never accept the hypothesis that agents behave in a Ricardian way, with some exceptions in the first treatment. We find clear evidence of departure in the other two settings. Our subjects appear to first decide how much to consume out of their resources, and then, sequentially and residually, to decide how much to bequeath.
Introduction
Experimental economics has gained a considerable attention and has shed some light on several microeconomic fields (e.g., decision theory under risk and uncertainty, public goods, industrial organization). Much less interest has been obtained by macroeconomics. 1 This is understandable: large-scale macroeconomic experiments are unfeasible because of political and budget considerations. However, modern macroeconomic theory is strongly based on microeconomic assumptions, therefore one can implement experiments on the behavior of agents to cast some light on aggregate issues. Microfounded models often impose artificial restrictions on individuals' behavior that are not embodied in any available field data. Consequently, it often is not possible to empirically test the aggregate predictions that emerge from these models. Even in those cases where the aggregate predictions of microfoundation models can be tested using field data, it is not always possible to use field data to verify whether behavior at the individual level adheres to the predictions or assumptions of these models. On the other hand, controlled laboratory experiments can be used to test both the aggregate and individual predictions of microfoundation models.
Ricardian equivalence is not an exception. It is based on rational representative agent who maximizes an intertemporal utility function in which the utility of their descendants is an argument, subject to a resource constraint.
Empirical research on this topic has been usually carried out estimating some aggregate consumption functions. However, this kind of empirical strategy is not able to measure the actual bequest behavior of the subjects, and the way in which they form expectations about future events. While a considerable body of econometric evidence does not support debt neutrality, many authors think that data demonstrate that Ricardian equivalence holds in a mild version due to the fact that the econometric specification of the tests is incorrect and biased against it. The two most important surveys on this topic (Bernheim, 1987; Seater, 1993) conclude with opposite findings, contrary the former, favorable the latter.
We believe that the use of the experimental method may add some more evidence to this debate. Ricardian equivalence has already been the topic of one experiment (Cadsby and Frank, 1991; CF thereafter) . As discussed in the paper, we argue that their setting is too "ideal" and therefore that we try to test for some causes which are known in the literature to make debt neutrality to fail.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the theoretical reasons that cause departures from Ricardian equivalence, stressing the role played by liquidity constraints and income uncertainty. In Section 3 the experimental setting is described and analyzed with reference to similar frameworks. Section 4 discusses the results, and conclusions are drawn in the final Section. Barro (1974) states the irrelevance of the means of financing government expenditure through taxes or debt. Sufficient conditions for this result are lump-sum taxes; certainty about future levels of income, public expenditure, rates of return, etc.; perfect capital markets; and infinite horizons for households. Under these conditions, the known present value of taxes is fixed by the given path of government expenditure. This result applies as long as the government cannot pursue Ponzi schemes in which the public debt can grow faster than the economy forever. In this case, public borrowing can change the timing of taxes but not the present value. Therefore, the issue of an extra dollar of debt to cut current taxes by one dollar implies an increase by one dollar in the present value of future taxes.
Theoretical background
With lump-sum taxes, infinite horizons, and perfect capital markets, the representative household cares only about the present value of taxes. The timing of these levies does not matter. Since a deficit-financed tax cut does not alter this present value, the tax cut does not affect consumer demand. It follows that the extra government bonds issued to finance the tax cut are willingly held by households without any changes in market interest rates. That is, the additional dollar of public dissaving is met by an added dollar of private saving, so that national saving does not change.
The Ricardian proposition still holds with some modifications of the basic conditions. First, the irrelevance proposition is valid if households have finite lives, as long as the typical household is connected to future generations by a network of active intergenerational transfers based on altruism. For example, a tax cut financed by a budget deficit would appear to shift wealth from later to earlier generations. But the typical parent does not value this shift of resources away from children if the parent is already providing voluntary transfers to the children. Hence, there is no effect on parents' wealth in a full sense and, consequently, no changes in consumer demand.
All these conditions have been attacked because of their lack of realism. In what follows we concentrate on the theoretical arguments against Ricardian equivalence based on the existence of liquidity-constrained consumers and on uncertainty about future income.
They are preliminary to the experimental analysis we have conducted.
According to the literature, one of the most acknowledged departures from Ricardian equivalence is the existence of liquidity-constrained consumers (Heller and Starr, 1979; Hubbard and Judd, 1986) . Under the assumption that 20 percent of the population is liquidity constrained a $1 deficit-for-taxes swap could increase current consumption by about 25 cents, a far larger result than the one associated with the only wealth effect (5 cents). If there are inefficiencies in the credit market, some consumers cannot borrow or can do it at an interest rate higher than the lending one. Consumers will spend some of the money arising from a tax cut because the government gives them terms of exchange between current and future consumption which makes them better off than the market interest rate. If there is a tax cut these agents can increase their current consumption (constrained by their inability to borrow against the future income) and pay more taxes in the future. The government allows them to do what the credit market prevent to these consumers, and in this way they can increase their utility smoothing consumption all over their life. However, Yotsuzuka (1987) argues that, in many situations, liquidity constraints adjust in response to government policies, and that the nature of this adjustment restores Ricardian equivalence.
Uncertainty on future income is another reason for the failure for Ricardian equivalence. According to Feldstein (1988) , even in an economy in which altruism is the only bequest motive, taxes are lump-sum and there is no uncertainty on the date of individual's death, if second-period earnings are uncertain, bequests also are uncertain at the time of firstperiod consumption. If the individual knew with certainty that he was not going to make a bequest, the extra tax borne by the next generation would be irrelevant to him, and he could divide his tax cut between his own consumption in the first and second period. The individual raises his first-period consumption knowing that with probability 1 -p he will not want to make a bequest and will raise his second-period consumption by the reminder. With probability p the individual will have high income in the second period, will therefore choose to make a bequest, and will use some of his additional first-period saving to make a larger bequest than he would otherwise have made. Therefore, consumption rises more in response to an increase in current disposable income than to an equal present value increase in the disposable income of the next generation. Strawczynki (1995) obtains a generalization of this result in an infinite horizon model. He shows that because of income uncertainty and precautionary savings, Ricardian equivalence may fail. These results are obtained under the assumption that the third derivative of the utility function is positive. A distinction is made on the type of income uncertainty, which may concern the second period of the parents or the future generation. In a corner related to the first case, the parents' consumption is low and the solution associated has higher second derivative of the utility function than corners associated with children wealth. The marginal utility in "poor" corners is more sensitive to extra consumption, leading to a higher marginal propensity to consume in the first period.
Therefore, government transfers in the "second period uncertainty income case" allow for a substantial reduction in precautionary savings and boost consumption, while in the "future generation income uncertainty case" precautionary savings are only partially affected. In addition, it is useful to point out that the extent of the failure does not depend on the degree on income uncertainty. Chan (1983) and Barsky et al. (1986) have shown that when individual incomes are ex ante uncertain, and in the absence of contingent claims market (which would provide diversification of the risk), a bond-financed tax cut that is repaid through future proportional income taxes increases consumption. Therefore, Ricardian equivalence fails. The reason is that savings are increased less than the amount of the tax cut because the increase in proportional income taxes reduces the variance (riskiness) of uncertain future income. 2 A similar result also holds when individuals live only one period and are uncertain about the income that their heirs will earn. In this case, the non lump-sum tax on the descendants reduces its variance and therefore, by reducing the expected marginal utility of such income to the initial generation, reduces the desired bequest and increases current consumption.
A reconsideration of the magnitude of the risk-sharing effect is attempted by Busu (1996) . He considers an environment where future income is uncertain, the income tax is proportional, and a hybrid non-expected utility functional is maximized. He shows that the size of the risk-sharing effect, which depends on the relative strengths of "income" and "information" effects caused by a debt financed tax cut, is lower than the estimates of the above mentioned studies, for plausible rages of risk aversion and intertemporal substitution. Therefore, the marginal propensity to consume out of a debt financed tax cut is considerably lower than the Keynesian consumption propensity proposed by Barsky et al. (1986) . For a moderate degree of risk aversion, Ricardian equivalence may be a reasonable approximation.
Related to income uncertainty, bounded rationality is a cause of failure of Ricardian equivalence. Consumers are supposed to make rational forecasts on their future income, to distinguish between permanent and temporary changes both in taxes and deficits, and to rapidly adjust to changes both in nominal and real variables. Such calculations require a large amount of information and a sophisticated ability to compute that are not usually possessed by consumers. If just a part of consumers are uninformed on the level and the behavior of the public debt, Reiter (1999) shows that Ricardian equivalence may not hold, unless they can ascertain the pattern of government debt from other variables that are perfectly correlated with it.
Experimental design
In overlapping generations (OLG) experiments there are two established methodologies: one refers to CF, while the other has been applied in a number of papers by Ramon Marimon along with his co-authors (e.g., ).
CF designed a experiment in a OLG context in which two groups play the game for eight years, each year is made up by three periods, and the two groups overlap in the medium period. In the first period, the current generation has to allocate a given endowment between certificates and savings. In the second period a further endowment, which represents government deficit, may be given to that players. Then they decide between certificates and savings. In this case savings represent the bequests left to the future generation. The future generation receives an endowment and the bequests, and allocates this sum between certificates and savings. An amount equal to the second endowment given to the first generation is then subtracted from their resources. In the third period the second generation may only buy certificates. The experiments examined both expansionary and contractionary fiscal policies. The utility function is multiplicative in the arguments, which entails a high degree of consumption smoothing, and some kinds of departures from Ricardian equivalence are studied using an additive form or a function in which the utility of the descendants counts less the own consumption of the parents. Whenever the theory predicted a positive bequest, outcomes close to those predicted by Ricardian equivalence occurred, with some allowance for learning. Moreover, deviations are not unbiased as they display a tendency toward a Keynesian behavior. However, we believe that the setting of the experiment is too much controlled for the departures from Ricardian evidence previously analyzed, then this result is not surprising. Slate et al. (1995) build on CF to allow for uncertainty on debt retirement, that is the probability of repaying the debt is less than one. When this probability is low, consumption by the current generation increases, as predicted by Keynesian theory. However, when the probability of debt retirement increases, bequests rise to offset the future generations' expected repayment liability and deficit spending becomes much less expansionary. On a similar issue, van der Heijden et al. (1998) build their experimental setting on CF, with two differences. Firstly, there are eight successive generations instead of two in each OLG game. Secondly, the order in which agents participate to the experiment was random rather than fixed.
The other methodology has been mainly used to study monetary economies, the existence of stationary solutions and the inflationary process. In this environment, N agents are recruited and n of them played the role of the young generation, n played the role of the old generation, while the remaining (N -2n > n) were outside the game. At the beginning of each period, n of the (N -2n) players that were outside in the previous one are randomly selected to enter into the game. In this experiments transactions between generations take place according to the market mechanism, while in the other, because of the problem at hand, there are no market prices. One of the key differences of this approach with respect to the previous is that a long series of trades is played, and when parents die in the n period, they reborn as children in the n + 1 period. The game is stopped just once, after a long series of games. In contrast, in the other setting the game is stopped and restarted every times a pair of generations has played, and in each game subjects enter only once.
Altruism cannot be directly tested. Therefore, we build our experimental design on CF by imposing in the utility function of parents the utility level attained by their descendants.
The parents' utility function is:
where: C P 1 and C P 2 are parents' consumption in period 1 and 2, respectively and U D is the utility obtained by its descendant, which in turns is:
where: C D 2 and C D 3 are offspring consumption in period 2 and 3. Indeed, this is not a test for Ricardian equivalence, since it is more a test of the individual ability to smooth consumption in some way. Our goal is to test whether some allegedly departures for Ricardian equivalence are able to significantly change the size of the bequests left to following generations. Therefore we have designed three different experiments. The first one resembles quite closely to a Ricardian environment. The second and the third ones depart from that ideal setting, allowing for liquidity-constrained agents and for uncertainty on future income.
We have designed our setting in a way to combine some of the features of both approaches. Firstly, we follow the CF methodology to keep our environment as close as possible to the main experimental test of Ricardian equivalence. Therefore, the game consists of a number of different games. Secondly, their procedure may be vulnerable to "backward induction" (van der Heijden et al., 1998) , and therefore testing for Ricardian equivalence would become the same as testing for the ability of subjects to perform this game theory solution concept. Any result achieved in this way may be misleading. To overcome this problem we have taken some of the features of the second methodology. In doing so, we have recruited seventeen subjects. The computer randomly selected ten of them, five of which played as parents in the first period. The other five enter into the game in period two, while they play alone in period three. Therefore the game has to start again: five of the seven people that have not played in the first stage are selected to play along with and five of the ten that have already played. The roles of these ten people are randomly selected. It may happen that a person would stay outside the game for more than one period, as well as it is possible to participate in the same role for more than one period. Randomness in the participation to the games should ensure that the planning horizon of the players would not extend to the whole set of games. Because of its structure, we call our setting "Palio-like tournament".
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Since there is a known number of games, this setting may be subject to the "end game" effect.
However, data do not seem to be affected by this problem.
In the baseline treatment subjects selected to act in period 1 as parents receive a certain disposable income and an extra income -which represent the tax cut in the Ricardian storyare informed about their disposable income, an extra amount of money available in period 2 (both are equal in the two periods), and the income of their descendants. The money expressed in artificial experimental units. Therefore, they decide how much to spend and to save in the first period and, when resources become available, in the second period. For simplicity there is no interest rate. They are also informed at the beginning that the extra resources they use are subtracted to their descendants, and the amount of money they save in the second period is given to their heirs. Descendants start playing in period 2 when they get informed about their personal income available in period 2 and 3 and the amount of extra resources that parents have received. At the and of period 2 parents die, and in period 3 only descendants play. They receive the disposable income and the bequest, if any, left to them by their own parents, and the extra resources parents have received are subtracted. Then descendants die and the game starts again according to the rules described above. All the decisions are subject to a non-negative binding.
In the liquidity-constraint treatment agents acting as parents in the first period are informed about the personal disposable income available in periods 1 and 2, noticing that the latter is greater than the former, the extra amounts available in both periods is equal, and heirs' income. In the income-uncertainty treatment, in the first period parents are informed of their current disposable income, of the extra amounts available in periods 1 and 2, which is equal across periods, and their descendants' income. At the beginning of period 2 they are informed about the personal disposable income for that period, which may be higher, lower or equal to the one received in the first one. In contrast, nothing changes for descendants with respect to the baseline treatment. Across treatments we have given to parents the same income.
Typically, in OLG models, agents of each generation are given a certain endowment at the beginning of the first period that they have to allocate between the two periods in which they live. This approach is followed by CF. Because of the departures from Ricardian equivalence we want to study, and for the sake of comparability between different treatments, we find this way unfeasible. Giving all the income at the beginning would have made it impossible to model imperfections in the second period, liquidity constraints as well as income uncertainty. CF give extra income only in the second period. However, to give to liquidity-constrained consumers the possibility to smooth consumption via the tax cut, we have to provide them with additional resources also in the first period. To keep the structure as comparable as possible across treatments, we have given the income at the beginning of each periods in all the cases. 4 We treat the two generations in a rather asymmetric fashion: the burden of the proof of debt neutrality lies on the generation of parents, which are the only agents subject to the imperfection of Ricardian equivalence. This has been done to simplify the experimental environment. Moreover, as reviewed earlier, Strawczynsky (1995) has shown that the failure attributable to parents' income uncertainty is higher that the one associated with descendants' income uncertainty.
We have recruited three different groups of student; each of them has played one of the three treatments. We have done so to allow subjects to learn within each treatment, but not across them. Learning plays an important role in such an experiment: the multiplicative utility function, together with the OLG structure, needs some time and some reasoning to understand how to maximize it. However, learning in one treatment would have distorted the behavior of players, and would not ensure sample's independence in the estimation of the results. Finally, a single session with three different treatments would have lasted too much, decreasing the attention of players.
In May 2001 a series of experiments took place at the University of Siena using the experimental software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 1999) . Subjects were first-and second-year undergraduate students in economics with no prior knowledge of optimal intertemporal consumption theory and Ricardian equivalence. Each experiment composed by 60 games in which two generations participate. Every 15 games the relative magnitude of the parameters changed, that is we have modified the income of each generation and the size of the extra money received, constructing different environments (see Appendix 3). In particular, in the first session there are poor parents, rich descendants and low debt; in the second there are poor parents, medium-income descendants and medium debt; in the third there are rich parents, poor descendants and medium debt, and finally there are rich parents, rich descendants, and high debt. This has been done to isolate possible wealth-effects. In each group of 15 games there were minor changes in the parameters of interest. We call sessions these groups. Subjects were informed of the parameters' switching, but the direction of the changes was not told. Each experiment lasted about two hours and half.
Analysis of the results
In Appendix 2 we show that the optimal solution of the consumption problem at hand is to equate consumption in the two periods. In this Section we provide evidence on consumption smoothing and the size of bequests in all treatments. The first Session was set in such a way that offspring's generation is definitely richer than parents' are. The debt level helps to reduce the gap but not to invert the sign. We chose an opposite structure for Sessions 2 and 4: the negative intergenerational differential between personal income reverses its sign when adding debt to parents' income. In turn, Session 3 shows a huge positive difference between parents' and descendants' personal income, whose amplitude is augmented by debt.
Consumption smoothing
In the baseline the equality of consumption in the two periods is obtained in average in 40% of cases. In the first Session (periods 1-15) this value attains a minimum (26.6%). In the other Sessions it ranges between 43% and 48%. First-period consumption is lower than the second-period one for 43.3% of the sample. There is a clear difference between the first and the other Sessions: 52% against values between 38.6% and 41.3%.
In the uncertainty treatment evidence of greater consumption in the first period with respect to the second is decreased. They amount to 32% of the cases, with a very little difference across sessions. In the liquidity-constraint treatment this phenomenon reaches its minimum: only 12% of cases, with values ranging from 5.3% in the first and 20% in the fourth Session. To some extent subjects are more inclined to smooth consumption because of debt. Strict equality in consumption is recorded in 8% and 7% of the cases respectively in the uncertainty and liquidity-constraint treatments. CF maintain that there is a tendency toward discounting future with respect to current consumption. This finding is opposite to our.
It is useful to point out the variability in parents' decisions in the two periods. In the baseline difference between consumption levels in the two periods has a mean equal to -6.47 and a standard deviation equal to 20.84 and a median of 0 (equal consumption). In addition, 65% of the differences belongs to the interval (-5, 5) . Average difference amounts to -4.18 in the uncertainty treatment (standard deviation equals to 22.18). The median value is -5, while the range (-5, 5) includes 1/3 of the cases. In the liquidity-constraint the average difference is -23.4, with a standard deviation equal to 31.32. The median value is -15 and in the range (-5, 5) there is only 11.5% of the cases. Figures 1 and 2 show differences in inter-periods consumption for parents respectively for the baseline vs. uncertainty cases and for the baseline vs. liquidity-constraint treatments. It appears that under uncertainty agents use debt generating high inter-periods consumption variability. They do not engage in precautionary saving. The extreme variability of parents' consumption choices in the liquidity-constraint treatment, particularly in Sessions 3 and 4 (on the abscissas starting from observation 151), suggests that they do not consider extra resources as wealth. They systematically consume more in the second than in the first period. This is more likely in the baseline (Fig. 3 ) than in the other treatments, with many of the consumption combinations being located along the line or in the neighborhood, even if a considerable variability does exist. The scatterdiagrams for the two other treatments show both much more dispersion and a regularity: it appears that consumption in the second period is greater than the one in the first period. We interpret these data arguing that, when agents face situations more complex than a sort of ideal setting they fail, on average, to reach a satisfying level of consumption smoothing. The failure has a double face: there is an higher number of failing agents relative to the entire sample, and the magnitude of the dispersion of their choices is greater.
Dealing with an uncertain income profile, agents do not generate saving due to a precautionary motive. It is important to notice that income in the second period was set lower, on average, than in the first. A common reaction to this setting was the use of the full amount of income in the first period. Doing that, in the second period subjects face a dilemma: to use the amount of debt to smooth consumption level or to preserve it for their future generation.
They usually choose an intermediate solution: part of the debt is consumed, the rest is for bequest. The chosen option does not allow us to conclude they are effective in smoothing their consumption.
A simple regression run using parents' consumption differential as dependent variable
shows that there is a positive correlation with parents' income differential and a smaller positive one with intergenerational income differential. Therefore, the larger the difference between parents' and descendants' total personal income, the bigger the spread between first and second period parents' consumption. In other words, it seems that they act as myopic inequality adverse agents: myopic for the lack of a precautionary saving in the first period; inequality adverse for sacrificing part of the extra amount to not worsen their heirs' poorer situation. Finally, and not surprising, debt is negatively correlated to consumption differential.
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The liquidity-constraint case shows close analogies: 60% of parents consumes in the first period at least the full amount of their own personal income. It is easy to conclude that they consider the extra amount available as another source of wealth. Moreover, consider that the rate at which personal income increases is constantly high ranging from 100 to 112%: an easy explanation for inconsistencies to reach a smooth consumption path.
Even in this case we could observe a myopic inequality adverse behavior. Myopia is made evident in the reinforcing path in the consumption of the debt: in the second period parents are not inclined to give up to a part of their personal income. In contrast, they keep using part of the extra-amount for their own consumption. Inequality aversion clearly appears in Session 3, in which parameters imply a huge intergenerational differential in personal income in favor of parents' generation.
Bequest size and motive
Figures 6-8 show the frequency of classes of net bequest in the different treatments.
By net bequest we mean the difference between the tax cut and the bequest left to the offspring. A Ricardian agent would leave a 0 net bequest, while a Keynesian agent would leave a negative one.
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On the ordinates we report the fraction on observed bequests belonging to those classes. It turns out that the majority of subjects bequeath a sum close to 0. 6 This claim does not hold for our 1 st session: in this case a negative net bequest is the optimal strategy as a deficit-financed government transfer avoids parents' generation from being definitely poorer than the second one. In the two departures (Fig 7 and 8 ), it appears that there are different behaviors. In the uncertainty case a greater number of agents leave a negative net bequest; there is also a substantial fraction of subjects that leave a positive net bequest. This fraction is smaller in the liquidity-constrained case.
In addition, useful information is given by variance analysis. A comparison between baseline and uncertainty yields a value of the F(299, 299)-statistics is 0.461. Therefore, we can reject the null hypothesis that the two variances are equal, against the alternative that the variance of the former is lower than the variance of the latter. Similar results are obtained comparing baseline and liquidity-constraint: the value of the F-statistics is 0.507. Under liquidity-constraint, the variance is significantly greater than in the baseline case. In both cases the significance level is 0.01. When we consider the results session by session, we get the same general outcome with the exception of Session 1. In this case we cannot reject the null hypothesis of equality between the variances for the two pairs baseline-uncertainty and baseline-liquidity constraint. Significance levels are 0.01 and 0.05, respectively.
Uncertainty increases sample variance. With reference to bequests, this does not allow subjects to use debt in a way that enables them to smooth their inter-periods consumption. At the same time, there is no trade-off between consumption smoothing and bequest: agents that engage in less consumption smoothing are also those who leave highly negative bequests. In the liquidity-constraint treatment the average rate of change between the first and the second period is rather high: it ranges between 101.3% in Session 4 and 111.2% in Session 1. In this treatment, however, agents that tend to smooth consumption are also those who leave Ricardian bequests (particularly in Sessions 2 and 3). The Mann Whitney test, performed by coupling two treatments per time, is significant at the maximum level when using the baseline. The p-value is .067 when comparing uncertainty and liquidity treatments. The very same results are obtained by the Kruskal-Wallis test. always refuse the null hypothesis (equality of mean) with respect to the alternative one that average bequest in the baseline is greater than in the other two treatments.
Comparing the net average bequests by treatments, behavioral differences appear relevant in two aspects. The number of observations valuably close to the null average is much greater in the baseline than in other treatments. This is due to the fact that the number of subjects whose behavior is more inclined to be defined Ricardian is higher in the first treatment. Besides, intensity of their Ricardian behavior is higher. In other words, the baseline framework seems to enable subjects in the parents' generation willing to behave in a Ricardian fashion to recognize easily the strategy through which it is possible to obtain the desired result. In the other treatments trials and errors are much wider, even by subjects whose average behavior clearly shows a tendency toward a Ricardian bequest strategy.
Conclusions
We have presented the results on a series of experiments in which we have tested for possible departures from Ricardian equivalence. We can never accept the idea that debt neutrality works, even if we find some approximations in the baseline. Uncertainty and liquidity-constraints are very likely to make debt neutrality to fail. Our experiment does not replicate the results of previous experiments in the environment closer to the theoretical benchmark. It is possible that this difference comes from the matching rule we have used, which is not vulnerable to backward induction, and to a higher number of parameters that may increase computational difficulties.
This experiment also differs from Ballinger et al. (2000) , which analyze precautionary saving in a life-cycle framework. Their laboratory design allows investigation into the role for learning in a social context. They assigned each subject to belong to one of three "generations". Subjects in later generations were allowed to watch their "antecedents" play and were encouraged to discuss experimental outcomes and decision strategies with them.
Data reveal a strong tendency for subjects to under-smooth their expenditure patterns relative to intertemporal optimization in the context of a stochastic life-cycle allocation problem.
Subjects fail to carry throughout most of the life-cycle a large enough buffer-stock of assets to facilitate optimal consumption smoothing across income realizations. Subjects belonging to
The baseline treatment

Instructions of the baseline experiment (distributed and read aloud).
This is an experiment on intertemporal choice funded by the Department of Economics of the University of Siena. Taking the right choices, i.e., maximizing your score functions, you can earn a considerable amount of money. This sum will be given to you in cash at the end of the experiment, in a private way. The experiment lasts about two hours and half, and during it you cannot communicate with other students.
The computer will randomly divide you in three groups. The first two will play, while the third will be waiting to enter in the experiment in the following repetition, when some of the players of the first two groups will be randomly selected by the computer to await. This procedure will be repeated each time. Each member of one group will be randomly matched with a member of the other group. We call the two groups that play, A and B respectively. Each member of the group A will be matched with one person in group B. We call them partners. There are no relationships among members of the same group.
The life of each subject is divided in two periods. In the first period of each session only group A plays. At the beginning of the second period group B starts playing. At the end of the second period members of A exit and group B only keeps playing. For the sake of convenience we indicate with 1, 2, and 3 the three periods, respectively.
PARTNER A'S PRIVATE INFORMATION
In their first period, partners A are given the following information:
• The personal disposable income available in period 1 (I A 1 ).
• The personal disposable income available in period 2 (I A 2 ).
• The income available to your partner B in period 2 (I In addition, they will be informed about the availability of an additional extra amount of money for each period:
• Extra amount in period 1 (D 1 ).
• Extra amount in period 2 (D 2 ).
Bear in mind that the sum of these extra amounts will be subtracted, when partners A exit from the game, from the available income of the partner B. 
PARTNER B'S PRIVATE INFORMATION
In the first period in which partners B play, they will be informed about:
• The personal income available in period 2 (I B 2 ).
• The personal income available in period 3 (I B 3 ).
In addition, they will be informed about the amount of extra resources that partners A have received.
At the beginning of the third period, partners B will be informed about the sum of extra resources partners A have received (already known), that they have to pay back, and the sum left to them by their partners A, if any.
PARTNER B'S DECISIONS
In the second period, they will choose how much income (I We provide you with a sheet of paper to record your parameters, decisions, and scores, if you wish. However, the computer will also do this at the end of each game. If you have any question please raise your hand, one of the experimenters will come to you.
Are there any questions?
The credit-constraint and the income uncertainty treatments
The instructions are quite similar to those of the baseline experiment. We do not report the full-length instructions but only describe the differences, which mainly concern partners' A information and endowments.
In the credit-constraint treatment partners A in the first period are informed about the personal disposable income available in periods 1 and 2, noticing that the latter is greater than the former, the extra amounts available in both periods, and partner B' income.
In the income-uncertainty treatment, in the first period partners A are informed of their current disposable income and of the extra amounts available in periods 1 and 2 and partner B' income. At the beginning of period 2 they are informed about the personal disposable income for that period.
All the computations needed to get the score, the rules of the game, and the instructions to partners B are the same as before.
